Proponents of the bill argued that most other types of income were already subject to withholding and that this legislation would simply plug a major tax loophole and tap a notorious source of unreported income. Arguments of this kind apparently convinced large majorities of both houses of Congress, and just before the August recess, the bill comfortably passed the Republican-controlled Senate and the Democrat-controlled House. The bill was signed by President Reagan and was scheduled to take effect within the year. Fearful, however, of the multibillion-dollar cost of enforcing the law, the banking industry dropped "the hydrogen bomb of modern day lobbying, an effort whose firepower was awesome, whose carnage was staggering. In one fell swoop down went the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, down went the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, down went the Secretary of the Treasury, down went the president of the United States" (Taylor 1983, A12) . Led by the American Bankers Association (ABA) and the U.S. League of Savings, the banking industry used newspaper advertisements, posters in branches, and, most importantly, inserts in the monthly statements typically sent to all customers to encourage people to contact Congress in opposition to the new law. The effort, orchestrated by the Chicago advertising and public relations firm of Leo Burnett and Company, deluged Congress with more than twenty-two million constituent communications (Berry 1989; Taylor 1983; Wittenberg and Wittenberg 1994; Wolpe 1990) . Weeks later the House (382 to 41) and the Senate (94 to 5) reversed themselves and overwhelmingly repealed the withholding on interest and dividend income earned by individuals.
In a similar vein, Catastrophic Care legislation in 1989 began with wide bipartisan support and ended up being overwhelmingly repealed. The legislation was introduced as a way to protect elderly and disabled Americans from huge hospital and doctor bills. It resulted in a powerful Democratic committee chairman literally being chased through the halls of Congress by angry gangs of elderly constituents. Again, the goal of the legislation was to protect elderly and disabled Americans from astronomical medical bills. The mechanism to finance this benefit was a supplemental Medicare premium capped at $800. Although 40 percent of seniors would have been required to pay an extra premium, only about one in twenty elderly Americans would have had to pay the full capped amount (Wolpe 1990) .
Groups like James Roosevelt's (FDR's oldest son) National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, however, opposed any increase in premiums no matter what the new benefits were. The group sent out mailings telling its five million members that the new law was a "seniors only tax" and suggested that all seniors would be forced to pay an extra tax for benefits that they already had. "Your Federal Taxes for 1989 may increase by up to $1,600 just because you are over the age of 65!" (Hosenball 1989) . The claims of Roosevelt's group and other direct-mail organizations were halftruths at best. Still, millions of elderly Americans contacted their members of Congress and the bill was repealed less than a year later. Now consider the dilemma of the "Big Three" automakers during the 1990 debate over the Clean-Air Act. Newsweek magazine (1991) described the challenge facing automobile companies: "How could they [the automakers] squash legislation that improved fuel efficiency, reduced air pollution and reduced dependence on foreign oil without looking like greedy corporate ghouls?" Jack Bonner, a prominent grass roots consultant, reasoned that smaller cars would hurt the elderly, the disabled, and those who must transport children. 1 So, in a matter of days, Bonner's "shock yuppies" contacted elderly organizations, disabled groups, and the Boy Scouts in the constituencies of key conference committee members and created a torrent of opposition to higher fuel standards. In this way, Bonner helped change what easily could have been framed as an antienvironment vote into a proelderly, pro-disabled, and pro-Boy Scouts vote (Newsweek 1991) .
In 1991, the American Bankers Association also turned to Bonner for help. In the fall of that year, the Senate had passed an amendment that would have regulated the interest rates banks could charge on credit cards. Because millions of Americans carried monthly balances on their credit card accounts, the bill looked like a winner. It was also one that would have taken a huge bite out of a major source of banking profits. In a four-day period, Bonner's firm was able to generate ten thousand phone calls from voters and community leaders in ten districts represented by members of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee (Stone 1993, 755) . When all was said and done, the amendment was not included in the House version of the bill and was subsequently dropped in a House and Senate conference committee.
The preceding cases provide prominent examples of what political scientists categorize as outside lobbying and what is known on Capitol Hill and in the professional community as grass roots lobbying or issue advocacy campaigns. Although there is no real formal definition of the tactic, popular and scholarly accounts alike consider grass roots or outside lobbying to be any type of action that attempts to influence inside-the-beltway inhabitants by influencing the attitudes or behavior of outside-the-beltway inhabitants. It stands in contrast to "inside strategies" such as private meetings with members and staff, testifying at committee hearings, and contributing money.
Grass roots lobbying is akin to the "going public" strategy "whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support" (Kernell 1993, 2) . Perhaps the best definition comes from a trade association executive speaking at a workshop on grass roots lobbying. He defined grass roots lobbying as "The identification, recruitment, and mobilization of constituent-based political strength capable of influencing political decisions."
Although it is tempting to make judgments about the effect of such interest group tactics, my goal in presenting these four examples was not to prove that grass roots lobbying was the decisive factor in the legislative battles. The four were complicated issues, and there are multiple explanations for the eventual outcomes in each case. For example, the Clean Air Act had been debated for years (Cohen 1992) , and a stock market drop and the comments is about to mobilize citizens in its district so that it can allocate staff time in advance to process the incoming faxes, letters, and phone calls. In fact, Bonner is even known to send flowers and chocolates to Hill receptionists the day before his efforts hit. of legions of financial experts preceded the deletion of caps on credit card interest in the final banking bill (Knight 1991). Besides, in many other instances grass roots lobbying had no apparent effect.
These four cases do, however, illustrate how grass roots lobbying can be an effective tool for lobbyists to convey information. More specifically, these cases illustrate how grass roots lobbying can signal legislators on the electoral consequences of their actions and provide information to constituents that may reframe an issue and possibly change mass opinion. These four cases suggest that understanding why and how lobbying choices are made is a crucial first step toward understanding both the character of mass participation and the nature of interest group influence. With our current level of understanding, the appropriate question is not whether orchestrated communications have no effect (as many political scientists have assumed) or whether they decide every issue (as many journalists have assumed), but instead, why and how they are used? At the very least, these cases -and the recent explosion in participation and mobilization that I will describe in the next chapter -strongly suggest that there is probable cause to investigate when, where, why, and how interest groups go public.
The Argument
Cases such as the ones just described, as well as the apparent growth in both communications to Congress and the use of grass roots campaigns as a lobbying tactic, were the inspiration for this book. Yet my brief description of these four grass roots campaigns, which attempted to stimulate constituent communications, really provide no startling new information and would not surprise scholarly observers of interest groups or mass participation. After all, scholars of participation are well aware of the impact of elite behavior in stimulating various types of mass participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995a) . Likewise, students of lobbying are well aware that outside tactics such as stimulating constituent communications to Congress are an important weapon in an interest group's arsenal of tactics (Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
The central argument made in this book is that the elite stimulus of mass participation binds together crucial questions of group influence and individual participation: When and why do people participate in politics? How do organized interests decide when, where, and how to influence public policy? These questions about mass participation and group influence, usually tackled separately by political scientists, strike at the heart of arguments about the state of democracy in America. To answer these two fundamental questions -to understand what determines when and why people participate in politics and how organized interests go about trying to influence legislative decision making -we must understand how and why political leaders recruit which members of the public into the political arena.
My goal is to develop and test a theory of how tactical choices in a grass roots campaign are made. My goal is to develop and test a theory of how tactical choices about when to lobby, where to lobby, and whom to lobby are made. In doing so, I demonstrate that outside lobbying activities deserve a place in any correctly specified model of interest group influence, political participation, or legislative decision making. Put another way, an understanding of why individuals participate in politics demands attention to more than just individual attributes and attitudes; and an understanding of how interest groups influence policy making demands attention to more than just the financial donations and direct activities of Washington-based lobbyists.
Yet, understanding how and why lobbying choices are made is difficult if we do not have an accurate theoretical picture of the strategic logic governing the use of grass roots lobbying. Although scholars have painted a more detailed theoretical and empirical picture of interest group formation and behavior in the past decade, the motives and goals of lobbyists are still not thoroughly understood. In fact, not knowing where to look may be one of the primary reasons why scholars have found it difficult to demonstrate interest group influence. For example, one of the problems with previous work on interest groups and lobbying has been that scholars have tried to identify the direct independent influence of particular strategies and tactics. A typical question is, With all else held constant, what is the independent direct influence of a PAC donation on a roll call vote? As these cases suggest, however, lobbyists may work indirectly through constituents to influence congressional decisions. A more detailed understanding of the strategic objectives of lobbying is required.
Similarly, in the mass participation literature, attention to the effects or goals of citizen activity is often divorced from attention to the causes or correlates of citizen activity. Indeed, the standard style in many studies of participation is to stipulate that participation matters and then to identify its causes. I contend that who participates and how participation matters are questions that should not be studied separately. It is not possible to understand elite efforts to stimulate mass participation and communications to Congress without also understanding the politics and political context in which grass roots lobbying and communications to Congress take place.
Data and Methodology
This book reports on empirical research designed to understand how and why interest groups utilize outside lobbying tactics. Although this study is primarily concerned with why and how interest groups decide which citizens to recruit into the political arena, I also discuss a broader range of tactics that interest groups use when they go public. To investigate the strategic calculations and decisions made by organized interests in such grass roots or outside lobbying campaigns, I utilize multiple sources of data collected in different ways and at different times.
One set of data utilized in this book consists of public opinion surveys. During the summer of 1994, I was able to add participation and recruitment questions to the Battleground Poll, a national survey jointly conducted by a Democratic polling firm and a Republican polling firm. 2 Although many surveys contain "contact Congress" questions and many surveys contain an "electoral mobilization" question, few studies specifically ask whether a respondent was recruited to lobby Congress and with respect to what issue. Data from the Battleground Poll enable me to test specifically the effect of recruitment contacts on individuals and to investigate who, in fact, is being recruited.
In addition, a large-sample Times-Mirror survey conducted in July 1994 provides another barometer of citizen participation during the identical time period and also affords another opportunity to investigate the effect of targeted districts on political participation. I also use data from the National Election Studies (NES) in this book. The NES data provide a time series on participation, permitting me to analyze how the quantity and partisan composition of those who contact Congress have changed over time.
These data sources are certainly valuable for my purposes. Nevertheless, to understand grass roots lobbying and mass participation, it is vital to go beyond the sample survey. Accordingly, the main body of research in this book comes from data gathered in forty-one in-depth personal interviews with interest group representatives. 3 The unit of analysis, however, is neither the individual whom I interviewed nor the group he or she represented. It is instead the individual grass roots lobbying campaigns and tactical choices that were made. In most of the interviews, more than one lobbying campaign and more than one set of tactical choices were discussed. Altogether, the forty-one interviews covered ninety-four separate grass roots lobbying campaigns across fifteen issue domains. The forty-one interviews come from a sample of eighty organizations that were drawn from a list I compiled of 191 interest groups pursuing grass roots tactics in the 103rd Congress. Compiling such a sampling frame was not a straightforward task. Although there are many lists of interest groups and lobbyists available (Washington Representatives is probably the most extensive), there is no roster of groups that specifically employ the tactic of stimulating constituent communications to Congress. In fact, the lobbying reform bill that was finally passed in 1995 specifically excluded requiring groups to register if they stimulate constituent communications. Furthermore, many groups employ consultants and other third parties to conduct their grass roots campaigns. So, with no readily available list from which to sample, I created a sampling frame from different media and political sources.
First, from April through November 1994, while working in Washington, I monitored on a daily basis the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post, making note of any ideological group, union, trade association, or corporation that was mentioned as pursuing grass roots tactics. Second, I also monitored two weekly publications that cover Congress, interest groups, and professional activity inside the beltway: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and the National Journal. Third, I monitored the Hotline, a daily briefing memo of political news that summarizes reports from media outlets from all over the country, and the Healthline, a similar service that concentrates solely on the policy and politics surrounding health care legislation. 4 Fourth, I obtained a copy of the registration list for the Public Affairs Council's annual workshop on mobilization tactics. (See Appendix B for a list of the groups in the sampling frame.)
Using the list derived from these sources, I drew a random sample of twenty groups from each of the four different types of interest groups and sent letters requesting confidential, not-for-direct-attribution interviews to representatives of eighty groups. 5 In the case of unions and left-leaning ideological groups, the initial response to my letters was quite poor. 6 Therefore, I used the introductions of friends in Washington to gain access to two of these groups and then used these connections to schedule other interviews. 7 Even with this snowball method, the interviews were with groups that were originally on my list. All told, I received responses from forty-eight groups and eventually interviewed representatives from forty-one for a response rate of 51 percent. Table 1 .2 shows the distribution of groups in my sampling frame and final sample, as well as response rates and the number of grass roots campaigns discussed. 8 Since the unit of analysis was individual lobbying campaigns, there was an added level of sampling. My first question to the interest group representatives I interviewed was to name three recent issues in which they employed grass roots tactics. Even though my goal was to talk about all the recent issues where a group pursued a grass roots strategy that attempted to stimu-4 While the monitoring of all these publications obviously could have been done anywhere, working in an office that had each of these papers and magazines delivered made the process much easier. 5 The interview requests were sent on University of Michigan Department of Political Science stationery, and I identified myself as a graduate student conducting dissertation research. 6 This experience is similar to reports I have heard from other scholars. It is also similar to Jack Walker's experience with his mail survey of interest groups, where unions had the lowest response rate and were not used in his analysis (1991). 7 In general, I also found that unions and ideological groups were not as forthcoming in the interviews. They allowed me to look at fewer background documents and gave me less detailed behind-the-scenes explanations. In a significant finding for future social science research methods, the one exception to this rule was the union representative whom I interviewed at a bar! 8 A recent mass survey of interest groups yielded the following distribution of interest group types (Leech 1997): trade associations, 28 percent; professional associations, 20 percent; businesses and corporations, 19 percent; government and institutions, 5 percent; and other nonprofits, 28 percent. Note: In his 1985 survey of interest groups Walker used the Washington Information Directory, published by Congressional Quarterly Press, for his sampling frame. Because Walker was primarily interested in how organizational factors influence strategies, he excluded corporations from his sample. For-profit trade associations composed 37.8 percent of his sample, not-for-profit trade associations composed 32.5 percent, mixed-trade associations composed 5.8 percent, and citizen groups composed 23.9 percent (Walker 1991, 51).
late constituent communications, time often did not permit this. This sampling method focused on the first campaign that a respondent picked and likely yielded larger and more prominent campaigns. 9 The research strategy of discussing specific issues differs from how some scholars have previously studied interest group tactics and tactical decisions. Most previous surveys of interest groups have asked respondents to generalize about their activities and the rationale behind their actions (Berry 1977; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991) . Although these surveys provided extraordinarily valuable information, their methods make it impossible to understand the political context or political environment in which lobbying decisions take place. Wanting to understand how the political environment influences political decisions and believing that respondents would be best able to describe their actual choices, my method borrows from Kingdon (1989) . Specifically, I asked my informants to talk about their decision making in the context of particular political issues. 10 The great majority of the interviews were conducted in person in the Washington, D.C. offices of the selected groups. Most of the interviews were completed between February and November 1995. Three of the interviews, however, were conducted at corporate headquarters outside the beltway; three were conducted on the phone; one was conducted in a taxi as I accompanied one of my respondents on a trip to Dulles Airport; and one was conducted at a bar.
The interest group representatives with whom I spoke were familiar with the rules for not-for-attribution interviews and seemed comfortable with my note taking. Occasionally -usually after a particularly frank commentinformants would remind me that their comments were not-for-attribution. During the interview I coded responses to questions from my interview schedule about strategic objectives as well as constituent and legislator targeting. In only a few cases did I have to push a respondent to explain to me more clearly his or her organization's strategic goal or tactical choices on a particular lobbying campaign. (See Appendix B for the interview instrument.)
Although my goal was to gather basic quantifiable information about the maximum number of lobbying choices, I also wanted to give respondents the opportunity to provide me with more in-depth information and a greater understanding of how grass roots lobbying campaigns are conducted. In other words, while still striving to gather basic information from every inter-view, I also wanted to take advantage of the access I had gained and the knowledge and inside insights of my informants. Therefore, if I was getting particularly frank, colorful, or more in-depth information, I would not hesitate to deviate from the interview schedule.
To reiterate, the list from which I drew my sample was not an exhaustive and unbiased one of groups pursuing grass roots tactics. Therefore, the interview data do not reflect a random sample of all interest groups that orchestrated constituent communications, nor all tactical decisions that were made around issues in the 103rd and 104th Congresses. 11 Although it is impossible to measure bias with no information on exactly what the population should look like, my sample drawn from media sources surely overrepresents large, prominent, and media-friendly groups. Consequently, it is impossible to make inferences about all groups, all mobilization campaigns, or all tactical choices from the frequencies in my data. What's more, the data do not permit judgments to be made about the effectiveness of grass roots mobilization as a lobbying tactic.
Nevertheless, whereas in a perfect world a random sample of groups pursuing grass roots tactics would have been readily available, the goal of this research was not to measure the effect, frequency, or even organizational factors that allow grass roots campaigns to be pursued. Instead, the goal of this research was to study strategic calculations and political decision making. Although no claim is made that they perfectly represent the entire universe of groups pursuing grass roots mobilization strategies, I sampled and completed interviews with a wide range of groups holding diverse ideologies, goals, and organizational structures. All in all, the data from these interviews provided a substantial first step toward understanding how and why interest groups stimulate the grass roots.
Taking a page from Richard Fenno (1978), many of the arguments made in this book are also informed by a significant amount of soaking and poking. For instance, over an eight-month period during 1994, I worked as a participant-observer pollster with a political consulting firm in Washington, D.C. This experience provided me with a unique vantage point from which to view electoral and legislative politics preceding the 1994 election. The firm's client list not only included many Democratic congressional candidates, but scores of interest groups on both sides of every imaginable fence. 12 My experience working in Washington allowed me to immerse 11 Although my sampling frame was comprised of groups pursuing grass roots strategies in the 103rd Congress, many of these groups also pursued similar tactics in the 104th Congress. Therefore, my sample of grass roots campaigns also includes issues from the 104th Congress. 12 From May to November of 1994 I worked as a senior analyst for the Washington, D.C., polling firm of Mellman-Lazarus-Lake. Its client list included four incumbent Democrats myself in the political process -to observe and talk with members of Congress, interest group representatives, and congressional and White House staff, as well as other consultants. In addition, I drew on information gathered at workshops for grass roots professionals and my own experiences and observations as a journalist to understand the strategies and tactics as well as the methods and technologies involved in stimulating constituent communications to Congress.
Plan of the Book
In Chapter 2, I trace the rise of communications to Congress and briefly discuss some previous work on lobbying and participation. I discuss how the traditional explanations for participation have a difficult time accounting for differences in rates of communication to Congress from year to year and district to district (not to mention why any citizens contact Congress at all). Although mobilization by elites appears to be a possible solution and is on the rise as a lobbying tactic, I also discuss how traditional explanations of lobbying tell us little about when, where, and toward whom is the tactic likely to be used. In Chapter 3, I draw on the participation, legislative behavior, and interest group literatures to devise a theoretical model to understand why and how strategic and grass roots lobbying decisions are made. I argue that lobbyists have varied motives and that their tactical choices depend on their strategic objectives and the information they must convey to legislators and constituents. I argue that targeting decisions are a multistage process in which lobbyists attempt to evaluate the influence that a particular individual's communication to Congress will have on the eventual outcome of a particular legislative or electoral fight. These tactical judgments ultimately determine decisions about when to target, where to target, whom to target, and how to target. In building a theory, I argue that these judgments are based on the fact that, unlike votes in an election, communications to Congress are not interchangeable. More precisely, I argue that the effect of a communication on the policy process is a function of the individual com- municating, the legislator being communicated to, and the message needing to be communicated.
In Chapter 4, I begin the empirical tests of my theory of grass roots lobbying choices. I use data gathered from seventy-three grass roots lobbying campaigns to examine when, where, and how groups recruit citizens into politics, and who gets recruited. In addition to the interviews, I reviewed primary documents and media accounts and made use of my own experiences as a journalist and political consultant.
Chapter 5 turns to the specific case of health care. The debate over health care reform and the Clinton plan, which would have changed the way oneseventh of the economy functions, was one of the biggest policy battles in recent memory. Using a combination of media accounts, professional publications, and interviews with many of the major policy and lobbying players, I examine the role elite-orchestrated mass participation played in the battle over health care reform. I use this case as a way to test the assumptions from the theoretical framework as well as a way to acquire information about legislative and citizen targets during the summer of 1994. Such information about targeted states and districts is critical in testing a strategic model of mobilization and how participation between elections works.
In Chapter 6, I utilize the two sets of survey data -a 1994 Battleground Poll and a 1994 Times-Mirror poll -to explore patterns of lobbying and participation. More precisely, using econometric modeling in conjunction with the targeting information gathered in Chapter 5, I gauge the independent effect of group-targeting strategies on individual behavior. Examining individuals in cross section provides information about the effect that resources, characteristics, attitudes, and contacts with political leaders have on an individual's likelihood of participating. Adding contextual variables on targeted districts allows me to vary the strategic situation in order to gauge how the political environment influenced both elite recruitment and citizen participation.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, provides me with an opportunity not only to assess my theory in light of empirical findings but also to place the nature and use of elite mobilization of mass participation into a broader context. I discuss how my findings fit into the interest group and mass participation literatures and explain what my findings mean for specific reforms that have been proposed.
